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Adam Tyson

The Mystical Debate: Constructivism
and the Resurgence of Perennialism

Mysticism is at the heart of a pivotal and ongoing academic debate, yet it
can be an uncomfortable subject to explore, mainly due to the myriad definitions for the term mysticism that one encounters. Etymologically, the “myst”
prefix has led to the colloquial use of mysticism as denoting practices, traditions,
and beliefs that are simply shrouded in mystery. As Walter Stace puts it, “[it]
is absurd that ‘mysticism’ should be associated with what is ‘misty’ . . . there
is nothing misty, foggy, vague or sloppy about mysticism,”1 rather, it is characterized by vivid experience. Academically, “mysticism” has been narrowed to
describe “mystical experience” in no small part due to William James’ landmark
exposition of mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience. Mysticism is
anchored in experience, namely, mystical experience, and as a result, it is not
one particular tradition, but a theme that can be found in any religious tradition
correctly deemed mystical.
Yet, to this day, what is termed “mystical experience” is still a hotly debated
subject. On the modern landscape of this debate, there are at least two notable
ideological camps which stand in opposition to one another: the perennialists
1.  Walter Stace, “The Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 363.
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and the constructivists. Two experiential events which may be considered mystical, in the perennialist sense, are at the heart of the debate between these two
ideological stances: Absolute Unitary Being (AUB) and the Pure Consciousness
Event (PCE). Perennialists tend to claim that these events represent universal
traits of mystical experience, while constructivists argue that there are no such
universal traits. This paper seeks to conduct an exploration of Perennialism, and
Constructivism as a response, after which the PCE and AUB events are analyzed
in the context of that debate. Further evidence will then be drawn from mystical
traditions to support the prevalence of PCE and AUB experiences. As a result,
these two events will serve as a perennialist counterargument to constructivism
and its mystical relativism, demonstrating the persevering utility of a perennialist approach to mystical experience.
I. Perennialism and the Constructivist Response
Perennialism can accurately be described as the dominant treatment of
mysticism from William James’ exploration of mysticism in The Varieties of
Religious Experience, up through the constructivist response in the 1970s and
1980s. The name is primarily derived from Aldous Huxley’s work which labeled
mysticism as “the perennial philosophy.” Perennialists saw mystical experience
as representing “a direct contact with a (variously defined) absolute principle.”2
Since this “contact” can be found existing within several traditions, “Religious
traditions, they argued, all teach a cross-culturally similar philosophy that does
not change over the centuries, i.e., a perennial philosophy.”3 Evelyn Underhill
posits a definition of mysticism that depicts this perennialist understanding of
mysticism’s role in religion as a whole. Her definition describes mysticism as
“the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete
harmony with the transcendent order; whatever be the theological formula
2.  Robert K. C. Forman, “Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting,” in The
Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K. C. Forman (New York: Oxford
UP, 1997), 31.
3.  Ibid.
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under which that order is understood.”4 The concept that mysticism is unitive
survives through modern definitions, but what is problematic with Underhill’s
definition is the use of the term “innate.” It is the innateness of the experience, as
well as the assumption that a transcendent order actually exists, that has inspired
the constructivists to vehemently reject such a definition of mysticism.
Constructivists, such as Steven Katz, Hans Penner, and Robert Gimello,
put forth their pluralist theories in response to perennialism, each of which will
be briefly discussed below. Each one has perceived perennialism as an academically accepted view. Constructivism is by no means exclusive to the discussion
of mystical experience. It is an academic point of view that is closely related to
pluralism, relativism, and subjectivism. Put simply, constructivism asserts that
the individual constructs the surrounding world through his or her understanding, explaining experience and perception with mental constructs. What this
view means, in terms of how mystical experience is to be interpreted, is that
1) there is no objective, numinous reality with which the mystic can interact
or identify, and 2) there is no innate experience independent of mental and
cultural constructs.
Steven T. Katz’s Mysticism and Religious Traditions is a compilation of
articles with primarily constructivist views on mystical experience, and contains
an attack on the idea of an objective reality. His own article in this compilation,
“The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” expresses the constructivist distaste for claims to a transcendent reality:
The metaphysical naivety that seeks for, or worse, asserts, the
truth of some meta-ontological schema in which either the
mystic or the student of mysticism is said to have reached some
phenomenological ‘pure land’ in which he grasps transcendent
reality in its pristine pre-predicative state is to be avoided.5
There is good reason, from the constructivist’s point of view, why such
4.  Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1999), xiv.
5.  Steven T. Katz, “The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and Religious
Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983) 41.
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assertions of essential truth are so undesirable: reality itself is relative. Hans
Penner elaborates on this point in terms of mystical experience, declaring that
“[t]he basic assumption of the mystical relativist can be described as follows:
what is meaningful, what is in accord with reality and not in accord with reality,
shows itself in the context that a mystical system has.”6 In other words, it is the
particular religious or cultural system that determines what “reality” is as well
as how to achieve mystical union with it. This is opposed to one universal reality which is experienced through multiple mystical paths as many perennialists
would argue. Nailing down this point, Gimello bluntly asserts that “what various
mysticisms have most in common is their fidelity to their respective traditions.”7
Thus, the constructivist approach to mysticism, or mystical relativism, denies an
objective reality, and as a result, any interaction with it by the mystic. This goes
hand in hand with the second assertion of mystical relativism, that there is no
innate experience independent of mental and cultural constructs.
II. The PCE and AUB
Both the Pure Consciousness Event (PCE) and Absolute Unitary Being
(AUB) are well worth a thorough exposition in order to evaluate their respective
places amongst the Perennialist and Constructivist debate. Together they cover
a range of experiences that are commonly considered mystical.
A. Absolute Unitary Being
The neuroscientists Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg are responsible
for the creation of the term Absolute Unitary Being.8 Roughly speaking, AUB
may be described as “theistic mysticism,” a mysticism that is deity-based. AUB is
achieved after a journey from dualism to monism; it typically entails the soul, or
the self, arriving at union with a divine entity or transcendent reality. Newberg
6.  Hans H. Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see note 5), 93.
7.  Robert Gimello, “Mysticism in Its Contexts” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see note 5),
84.
8.  Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Andrew B. Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious
Experience (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999), 95–96.
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and d’Aquili describe this ascent in emotional and aesthetic terms in that its
achievement is coincidental with ecstatic emotions and an overwhelming sense
of wholeness, or unity. The concept of AUB is problematic from a constructivist
standpoint because of its consideration of a numinous reality, or supernal being
to whom the mystic ascends.
B. Pure Consciousness Event
Robert K.C. Foreman is responsible for the term Pure Consciousness
Event,9 and has written extensively about it in addition to having experienced
mystical states himself. Like AUB, the PCE is the result of a journey from
dualism to monism, however, if AUB can be described as the ascension of the
soul towards unity with the divine, the PCE is an inward journey of the soul
into itself, achieving what is often termed the “void,” or pure awareness. The
PCE is problematic from a constructivist standpoint, since there can be no unmediated experiences such as the supposed cognitive blankness of a PCE. The
cognitive status of mystical experience is a subject of much debate and aside
from individual claims, there is no way of knowing whether the mind ever is
truly rid of conceptions as the PCE is purported to be.C. PCE and AUB within
the Perennialist/Constructivist Debate
Yet for all this debate, a major fallacy is being committed on the part of
both perennialists and constructivists; it is the importance that is placed on assessing the “reality” of mystical experiences. An ethnographer does not need to
assert his own belief in the religious system of the culture under study in order
to appreciate the importance of religious belief and its impactful role in society;
likewise, one need not accept that the mystic is uniting with a numinous reality, but simply that the mystic claims to unite with such a reality. With this in
mind, a perennialism that asserts the essentiality of a particular trend in mystical
experience would appear misguided. Similarly, a constructivism that seeks to do
away with the categorization of similarities between traditions would also ap9.  Forman, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, 8.
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pear misguided, ignoring the many accounts of mystical experiences saturating
religious texts throughout history. Both the PCE and AUB can be validated in
a pragmatic fashion. First, time tested definitions of mystical experience can be
applied to both, and second, mystical traditions provide striking evidence for
the categorization into either Pure Consciousness Event or Absolute Unitary
Being.
First of all, this is no arbitrary division of mystical experience; mysticism is often divided into categories of “external” and “internal.” Walter Stace,
a noted scholar of mysticism, divides the experience into “extrovertive” and
“introvertive” mystical experience:
One may be called extrovertive mystical experience, the other
introvertive mystical experience. Both are apprehensions of the
One, but they reach it in different ways. The extrovertive way
looks outward and through the physical senses into the external world and finds the One there. The introvertive way turns
inward, introspectively, and finds the One at the bottom of the
self, at the bottom of the human personality.10
Accordingly, AUB can be described as extrovertive and PCE as introvertive. As stated above, both are monistic, or in Stace’s Neoplatonic words, “apprehensions of the One,” but the respective paths indicate an external journey
in AUB, and an internal journey in PCE. While these are different varieties of
mystical experience, they share three significant traits that help define them as
such: ineffability, a noetic quality, and a unitive perspective on reality.
William James labeled “ineffability” as the first characteristic of mystical
experience and it still holds today, although it requires some further elaboration.
First and foremost, if mystical experiences were truly ineffable, there would be
no accounts to speak of. Although the experience is ineffable, descriptions of
what it is not—negative descriptions—are commonly used to explain a mystical
experience. James describes this by stating:
The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as
mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it
10.  Stace, “Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion, 367.
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defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be
given in words. 11

Yet—and not necessarily to the contrary—Ninian Smart provides valuable insight as to how negative descriptions are not strictly ineffable. He writes
that “such terms as ‘indescribable’, ‘ineffable’ and so on are themselves performatives also, and help to express an off-scale sublimity beyond the usual rungs
of the ladder of value and joy.”12 Thus, ineffability, in the case of mysticism is not
to be considered strict ineffability, but rather, it simply necessitates the use of
“performatives” such as negative descriptions and metaphors.
The motivating force behind an attempt to describe mystical experience,
however, often results from another one of James’ “marks” of a mystical experience, which he calls its “noetic quality.” By this, he means that certain knowledge
is imparted through the mystical experience. In other words, a transcendent
experience provides knowledge to the participant. James describes this quality
as follows:
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem
to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge.
They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by
the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full
of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of
authority for after-time.13
To highlight two aspects of this noetic quality, James first describes the
experience as one that communicates knowledge in a way that goes beyond the
“discursive intellect.” He then describes this knowledge as carrying weight even
after the event of transcendence.
Often the knowledge that is imparted through mystical consciousness is a
11.  William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902; Wikisource, 2011), lectures XVI
and XVII, http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=The_Varieties_of_Religious_Experience/
Lectures_XVI_and_XVII&oldid=912487.
12.  Ninian Smart, “The Purification of Consciousness,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see
note 5), 123–124.
13.  James, Varieties of Religious Experience, lectures XVI and XVII.
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monistic representation of reality, bringing one to a third characteristic of mystical experience: a unitive perspective of reality. William J. Wainwright declares
that “[m]ystical consciousness . . . is ‘unitive’” and that in this consciousness
“[d]istinctions are transcended or overcome (although the way in which they
are overcome varies from one type of mystical experience to another).”14 As
Wainwright notes, and this paper has stated above, the path differs from tradition
to tradition, but the goal in each is monistic. AUB is unitive in an extrovertive
fashion, blending the self with a supernal presence, while PCE is unitive through
the utter lack of distinction achieved in the state of Pure Consciousness.
D’Aquili and Newberg place religious experiences and aesthetic states of
unity at parallel spots on an ascending scale in their article titled, “The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual, and Mystical States.”15 William James, like
d’Aquili and Newberg, was interested in the emotional sensation of a totally
unitive mystical experience, declaring that it is “[i]n this peculiarity” that “mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect.”16 Within
this spectrum, as the felt sense of unity increases, the emotional content of a
corresponding religious state does as well. This spectrum consists of levels of
classical aesthetics ranging from disunity to unity, or “Integritas.”17 Each rung on
this aesthetic ladder has a corresponding emotional state, and type of religious
experience associated with it. To exemplify this, Newberg describes “[a] transitional phase between aesthetic and religious experience,” that is, “romantic love,
which might be characterized by the phrase, ‘It is bigger than both of us.’”18 In
this situation, aesthetic appreciation can be seen to coincide with the awe and
corresponding emotional content in the religious sense. Newberg describes the
ascent up the spectrum: “As one moves up this continuum, one moves through
14.  Stace, “Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion, 356.
15.  Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, “The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual and
Mystical States,” Zygon 35, no. 1 (March 2000).
16.  James, Varieties of Religious Experience, lectures XVI and XVII.
17.  Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, “The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual and
Mystical States,” Zygon 35, no. 1 (March 2000): 43.
18.  Ibid.
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the experience of numinosity, or religious awe,”19 until “the self becomes as a
drop of water in the ocean of reality.”20 This final stage is what he and d’Aquili
term AUB. For example, one of the ascending states “involves an elated sense
of well-being and joy, in which the universe is perceived to be fundamentally
good and all its parts are sensed to be related in a unified whole.”21 D’Aquili and
Newberg place AUB at the very pinnacle of an emotional-aesthetic spectrum of
consciousness:
There is a progressive blurring of the boundaries between entities until one finally moves into Absolute Unitary Being (AUB).
AUB is characterized by absolute unity. There are no longer
any discrete entities that relate to each other. The boundaries
of entities within the world disappear, and even the self-other
dichotomy is totally obliterated. In AUB there is no extension
of space or duration of time.22
III. Newberg and d’Aquili’s AUB in Mystical
Traditions
Newberg and d’Aquili’s model is worth being put to the test; whether mystics, their texts and traditions, reflect this state in all its emotional, aesthetic, and
spiritual manifestations can determine if the model has pragmatic use or not.
Neoplatonic thought appears to affirm all of these in the state of Absolute Unitary Being. Plotinus, a philosopher-mystic of 3rd century Alexandria, expounds
the existence of a singular Unity, which he also terms the One, or even God,
from which all existence both emanates from, and shares a part in. Speaking
of the One he uses the highest Platonic Forms as points of reference, “while
both The Good and The Beautiful participate in the common source, The One
precedes both.”23 The One, then, is beyond even the highest platonic forms, that
19.  Ibid.
20.  Ibid., 47.
21.  Ibid., 42.
22.  Ibid., 43.
23.  Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna and B.S. Page (Digireads.com Publishing,
2009), 317.
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of “The Good” and “The Beautiful,” since form denotes difference, the highest
Unity conceivable, the One, must necessarily be above even these forms. Here,
Newberg and d’Aquili’s sense of wholeness accompanying AUB could not be
more apparent. Since the Unity must remain perfect, the self is necessarily a
part of this unity, and is capable of merging with the One through the very contemplation of it. Plotinus recognizes that the pinnacle of being, AUB, conveys
a strong emotional content, characterized by an ecstatic love. He writes of the
union of the soul with the One, “Suppose the soul to have attained: the highest
has come to her, or rather has revealed its presence . . . here is no longer a duality
but a two in one . . . it is as lover and beloved here . . . so huge the happiness she
has won to.”24 From this, one can see the aesthetic perfection in that the One
is beyond even beauty itself, and the ecstatic emotional content of the soul’s
merging from a spiritual belief in and contemplation of this concept.
From this analysis, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu mysticism can be evaluated similarly where the concept of a monistic God-concept, just like that of the
One, exists. Meister Eckhart, a Dominican scholar, declares God to be “That
being in comparison with which nothing better can be conceived”25— Plotinus’
very concept of the One having survived an entire millennium. Sufi belief revolves around the concept of uniting the soul with its infinitely divine origin,
Allah. Of the same infinite scale as Plotinus’ “One,” is the Upanishadic conceptualization of Brahman who “though one, takes new forms in all things that live.
He is within all, and is also outside.”26
Brahman is also Atman, or the divine self, in the Upanishads. Several
Hindu traditions borrow this concept, though under different names. In the
Bhagavad Gita, Krishna declares, “Nothing is higher than I am; . . . all that exists
is woven on me . . . ”27 Within various traditions, the self is capable of uniting
24.  Ibid., 454
25.  Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Oliver Davies (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin, 1994), 258.
26.  Katha Upanishad, part 5, in The Upanishads, trans. Juan Mascaró (London: Penguin Books,
1965), 64.
27.  Bhagavad Gita, trans. Barbara Miller (London: Bantam, 1986), 74.
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with a deity of the same infinite-beyond-conception scale.
Newberg and d’Aquili would need to confront the constructivist criticism
that there is no one transcendent reality which is being encountered objectively
from each tradition. Fortunately they would rather “maintain an attitude of
humility, rather than presume that our understanding of neurophysiology
can give us an intrinsic knowledge of the relationship between ‘reality’ and
consciousness.”28 Their model is just that, a mere model. Even though it is derived
from brain imaging scans and is empirically grounded, there is hardly certainty
regarding the correlation of the imaging to actual experience. Nonetheless, this
model illuminates several useful, inter-causal links between aesthetics, emotion,
and spiritual states, describing the progression towards AUB in terms familiar
to the mystic.
IV. Foreman’s PCE in Mystical Traditions
The Pure Consciousness Event can be defined as a mystical experience
as determined by the criteria mentioned above: ineffability, the knowledgeimparting noetic quality, and the presentation of a unitive model of reality.
Robert K.C. Foreman cites examples to illustrate just what the PCE is as its
ineffable nature evades description. In fact pure consciousness can be described
as a state which does not seek description while engaged. The yogic philosophy
of Patanjali perhaps exemplifies this state best. It refers to an inward journey,
beyond the layers of selfhood, towards what is seen as the true self, purusa, the
eternal soul. Patanjali describes this goal as the “enlightenment of the distinction
between the pure Purusa and Buddhi”29 where Buddhi is the lesser self, the Ego.
Patanjali’s path to one-ness is described in terms of going into one’s self, where
“the mind rests in itself ”30 and “the awareness of one’s individual self gets lost.”31
28.  D’Aquili and Newberg, The Mystical Mind, 120.
29.  Swami Hariharananda Aranya, Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali, trans. P.N. Mukerji (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1984), 7.
30.  Ibid., 7.
31.  Ibid., 8.
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This inward journey is seen elsewhere in Hindu philosophy and religious tradition. For example, in the Baghavad Gita, speaking of what essentially appears
to be purusa, Krishna remarks, “[e]ternal and supreme is the infinite spirit; its
inner self is called inherent being” and it “is the source of creatures’ existence.”32
The Upanishads echo in declaring, “all things find their peace in their inmost
Self . . . thus all things find their rest in Atman, the Supreme Spirit,”33 thus indicating a parallel between Atman and purusa as the pure, true self. In essence, the
PCE may be described as the consciousness resting in itself.
Yet, the PCE is by no means limited to Hindu tradition, it finds itself in
many Buddhist manifestations, particularly in the concept of sunyata, or nothingness. Specifically, the no-thought of Dzogchen in Tibetan Buddhism, like
the aforementioned Hindu traditions finds this state of consciousness to be the
natural, primordial state. Foreman even asserts that Meister Eckhart “discusses
what he calls gezucken, a state of being enraptured without sensory or intellectual
content” which he “understands as a transient encounter with what he calls the
innermost within the soul . . . wherein God exists in purity.”34
In his Mathnawi, Rumi presents a similarly inward approach to God,
“O God, do Thou reveal to the soul that place where speech is growing without
letters, That the pure soul may make of its head a foot (fly headlong) towards
the far-stretching expanse of non-existence.”35 This state of consciousness is not
necessarily associated with elative emotions like AUB, yet it is still accurately
described as mystical; since the PCE is characterized by a lack of thought or
distinction, it is inherently ineffable – it imparts knowledge about the nature of
the soul and of reality, and this knowledge is of a reality unified through lack of
distinction. Constructivist critics, however, have much to say on the matter of
the Pure Consciousness Event.
32.  Bhagavad Gita, 79.
33.  Prasna Upanishad, fourth question (see note 26), trans. Mascaró, 72.
34.  Daniel C. Matt, “The Concept of Nothingness in Jewish Mysticism,” in The Problem of Pure
Consciousness (see note 2), 146.
35.  Jalal al-Din Rumi, Maulana, The Mathnawí of Jalálu’ddín Rúmí, ed. and trans. by Reynold A.
Nicholson (London: Trustees of the E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1926), 168.
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V. Constructivist Critique of the PCE and Foreman’s
Response
Constructivists claim that there are no un-mediated experiences. What is
here meant by “mediation” is actually two-fold; mediation of experience occurs
on the individual level and, more broadly, on the cultural level. First, the individual interprets every perception and experience, forming mental constructs in
the process. Secondly, cultural constructs and religious systems provide the language and concepts that the individual uses to interpret his or her experiences.
Steven Katz describes these mediators as “forms of consciousness which the
mystic brings to an experience” which “set structured and limiting parameters
on what the experience will be.”36 He simplifies this, stating that “[p]re-mystical
consciousness informs the mystical consciousness.”37
First, Foreman responds to the undecided issue that it is the language that
comes before the experience, Katz may “be accused of committing the fallacy of
post hoc ergo propter hoc,” and iterates that “[t]he relationship between experience and expectation may be contingent, not necessary.”38In other words, just
because a mystic’s experience of a PCE comes after a lifetime of culture and
language, does not necessarily mean that those factors informed the experience.
Though it may seem as though Foreman is somewhat dismissing the obvious
impact of culture and language on one’s experience, there is actually good reason
to stand his ground on this point. The very nature of a PCE is defined by a lack
of distinction or discursive reasoning. No matter what language brings one to a
PCE, ideally, it is the same experience.
Hans Penner echoes Katz’s point writing that “[w]e must remember that all
we have for understanding mysticism is language, not experience” and that it “is
not mystical experience which explains mystical traditions or languages, rather

36.  Steven T. Katz, “The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and
Religious Traditions, 5.
37.  Ibid.
38.  Forman, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, 19.
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it is mystical language which explains mystical experience.”39 Not only is Penner
committing the same post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy as Katz, and assuming
the language precedes the experience, but as someone who has experienced
mystical states, Foreman can actually attest to mystical experience preceding
mystical language. By declaring that language, not experience describes mystical
phenomena, Penner, as well as Katz, are insisting that all purportedly mystical
forms of consciousness are lodged within discursive reasoning. This simply is
not the case where many mystical experiences are concerned, especially given
the role that ineffability plays in mystical experience.
Foreman congratulates the Katz and other constructivists saying,
“[t]hey have successfully removed the mystics from the perennialists’ borderless
desert.”40 Yet, when Hans Penner declares “that mysticism does not refer to any
particular kind of system or experience,”41 declaring the word itself to be what
Totemism was to religion a century ago, he seems to think they have taken it too
far. Hard-line constructivists appear to almost completely deny any possibility
for common mystical threads between cultures.
However, Foreman regards the PCE as one such common thread which is
made all the more common by the fact that it is supposedly Pure Consciousness,
and hence, something we all experience the same underneath language or conception. Newberg and d’Aquili likewise consider Absolute Unitary Being to be
a potentially universal trait in mystical traditions, contrary to mystical relativists
such as Katz, Gimello, and Penner. Andrew Newberg’s neuroscience and AUB,
as well as Robert K.C. Foreman’s PCE are quite possibly the last vestiges of mystical perennialism to be found in the modern academic debate. They serve as a
reminder that it is not such a mistake to conceive of human experience as being
the same underneath those mental constructs that divide people into culture.
Perhaps suggestions of universality are not at all unreasonable. In his book
39.  Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, 91.
40.  Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 43.
41.  Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, 95.
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In Gods We Trust, Scott Atran artistically describes similarities in human evolution:
Think metaphorically of humankind’s evolutionary history as a
landscape formed by different mountain ridges. Human experience that lies anywhere along this evolutionary landscape converges on more or less the same life paths, just as rain that falls
anywhere in a mountain landscape converges toward a limited
set of lakes or river valleys. This notion of landscape is a conduit
metaphor in the sense that it serves as a guide for a multisided
approach to the evolutionary riddle of religion.42
Relativism, constructivism, and pluralism are more than necessary to constructing an accurate understanding of human phenomena, but they can cause
one to forget the overwhelming array of human similarities. From a constructivist standpoint, it is easy, and many times necessary, to tear down the perennialist
treatment of mysticism. Surely it is at least as admirable an endeavor to unite
experiences, traditions, and beliefs into categories that encourage accuracy and
precision, rather than a hiding behind the negating curtains of relativism.

42.  Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002), 11–12.

